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Statutes
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-44 (1953 as amended)

AMERICAN FORK CITY, UTAH, ORDINANCES

§ 41-6-44

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-7-2 (1953 as amended)

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3 (1953 as amended)

APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1. Whether the officer's arrest of the Defendant was properly based on probable
cause that the Defendant committed a crime.
Issue 2. Whether the officer's alleged mistaken pronouncement at the time of arrest
invalidates the arrest and taints any evidence seized as a result thereof.
The standard for reviewing determinations of probable cause to arrest is two-fold. First,
the lower court's factual findings will be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Second,
the trial court's conclusions of law based on those facts are to be reviewed under a correctness
standard, according no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. See State v. Anderson,
910 P.2d 1229,1232 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted).
The issue was preserved pursuant to the Defendant's entering into a conditional plea
agreement wherein the Defendant reserved the right to appeal the lower court's decision denying
his motion to suppress. (Tr. at 112.)
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Constitutional Provisions
Statutes
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person with a blood
alcohol content of 0.08% or greater by weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state
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(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was committed
by the person.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1953 as amended).
AMERICAN FORK CITY, UTAH, ORDINANCES § 41-6-44.

A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may without
warrant, arrest a person . . . (2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class
A misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person
arrested has committed it.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-7-2 (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

This is a criminal appeal. The Defendant was charged by information with
driving under the influence of alcohol, a class "B" misdemeanor, in violation of section 41-6-44
of the Ordinances of American Fork City.
B. Course of Disposition Below
On March 7, 2000, the defendant filed his motion to suppress all evidence
subsequent to the arrest of the Defendant at his home on charges of obstructing justice. The
Defendant was not charged with obstructing justice, but was charged with DUI. (R. at 5.) The
court below held an evidentiary hearing on the matter and issued a ruling on June 14, 2000
denying the Defendant's motion to suppress. (R. at 78.) On January 24, 2001, the Defendant
entered into a conditional plea agreement whereby the Defendant pleaded guilty/no contest to
one count of driving while under the influence of alcohol as charged in the Information. (R. at
112.) As a condition of the plea agreement, the Defendant was allowed to preserve his right of
appeal in order to present his challenge to the admissibility of the evidence as outlined in his
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motion to suppress. (R. at 112.) On August 8, 2001, the Defendant was sentenced by the
Honorable Howard Maetani of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County and an order
for a stay of execution pending appeal was issued. (R. 138-140.) The Defendant filed a notice
of appeal August 2, 2001, thereby initiating this appeal. (R. at 142.)
C. Statement of the Facts
1. On January 30, 2000, Officers Lisa Shelby and Keith Southard of the American Fork
Police Department were called to assist the Lehi Police Department in investigating a custodial
interference complaint. (Hr'g. on Mot. to Suppress Tr. at 10-12.)
2. The Lehi Police Department reported that two individuals, Gina Singleton and
Defendant Larry Singleton, had taken the eighteen-month-old daughter of Jamie Boren and were
driving from Lehi to American Fork. The report indicated that both individuals were intoxicated
and provided a description of the truck they were driving. (Tr. at 10.)
3. Officer Shelby located the truck that matched the description provided and followed
the truck until it stopped at 403 West 300 South in American Fork. (Tr. at 10-11.)
4. Defendant was driving the truck and Officer Shelby approached him and spoke with
him. (Tr. at 12.) As she did so, she smelled the odor of alcohol on his person. (Tr. at 12.)
Officer Shelby asked the Defendant if he had been drinking. He ignored the question and began
to move toward the house, telling Gina Singleton to take the baby inside. (Tr. at 12.)
5. Officer Southard spoke with the Defendant. Officer Southard observed the
Defendant had a strong odor of alcohol comingfromhis breath; had glassy bloodshot eyes; and
was swaying back and forth. (Tr. At 17).
6.

The Defendant, in response to Officer Southard's questions, stated that the

Defendant had not "had a damn thing to drink." (Tr. At 17).
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7. Defendant and Ms. Singleton insisted that everyone move into the house to get out of
the cold. Everyone moved into the house, as requested. (Tr. at 13,18.)
8. Officer Southard attempted to perform field sobriety tests on the Defendant. (Tr. at
19-20.)
9. The Defendant performed one test using the wrongfingerto reach out and touch the
officer's pen and had difficulty doing so. (Tr. at 19.)
10. Defendant was belligerent and argumentative with Officer Southard, and refused to
properly perform additional field sobriety tests. (Tr. at 19-20.)
11. At this point, the Defendant attempted to leave and Officer Southard arrested him
for DUI or obstructing justice. (Tr. at 25.)
12. Defendant was transported to the police station where he performed field sobriety
tests and blew a 0.249 on an intoxilyzer test. (Appellant's Brief at 12) It is this result that the
Defendant sought to suppress in his motion to suppress evidence.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The Defendant was properly arrested because the officer had probable cause to arrest the
Defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The officer obtained sufficient
information to know that the Defendant was the driver of a vehicle that was reported to contain
two intoxicated individuals. Upon making contact with the Defendant, the officer smelled a
strong odor of alcohol comingfromthe defendant's breath. The officer also observed that the
Defendant had glassy, bloodshot eyes and that his body swayed back and forth as the officer
spoke to him. Additionally, although the officer was only able to perform a very limited number
of field sobriety tests, the Defendant had trouble with the first one and became upset during the
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administration of the second one, becoming uncooperative and belligerent. The Defendant also
denied having had anything to drink. Under these circumstances, the facts known to the officer
at the time of the arrest suggest that the officer could have reasonably believed that the crime of
DUI was committed and that the Defendant committed it. Thus, the Defendant's arrest was
proper and any evidence seized as a result thereof should not be suppressed.
The Defendant asserts that whether probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI
existed at the time of the arrest is irrelevant because the officer mistakenly announced that he
was arresting the officer for obstructing justice. See Brief for Appellant at 6-9. However,
whether the officer made this mistake does not taint the arrest because the officer had probable
cause to arrest for DUI. While Utah has not addressed this issue, there are several jurisdictions
that have, including the United States Supreme Court. The cases cited in the argument below
establish that a mistaken pronouncement does not taint an arrest as long as there was probable
cause to arrest at the time the arrest was made. This Court should follow these jurisdictions and
uphold the lower court's determination that probable cause to arrest for DUI existed, thereby
validating the arrest and the seizure of evidence obtained as a result thereof.
ARGUMENT
I.

The officer's arrest of the Defendant was proper because the officer had probable cause
to believe that the Defendant had committed the crime of driving under the influence of
alcohol.
The Defendant was properly arrested because the officer had probable cause to believe

that the Defendant had committed the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol, in
violation of section 41-6-44 of the Ordinances of American Fork City, which is identical to Utah
Code Annotated § 41-6-44. This statute states in pertinent part:
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person with a blood
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alcohol content of 0.08% or greater by weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders
the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control
of a vehicle within this state....
Regarding the arrest of the suspect, the ordinance further states that:
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in
his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was
committed by the person.
Id. Therefore, under the ordinance and statute, an officer may arrest an individual for DUI if he
or she has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred and that the violation was
committed by the individual.
With regard to probable cause determinations, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that
"probable cause is more than suspicion but less than certainty." State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d
220, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Indeed, "'In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians,
act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." State v. Dorsev.
731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Brieear v. United States. 338 U.S. 160,175,
69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310 (1949)) (alterations in original). More specifically, to determine whether
the officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for driving under the influence, in
violation of the aforementioned statute, the test is "whether from the facts known to the officer,
and the inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in
his position would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense." Lavton
City v. Noon. 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing State v. Hatcher. 495 P.2d 1259,1260
(Utah 1972) (footnote omitted)).
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In light of the standard articulated above, determining whether the officer had probable
cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI is an imprecise determination of probability that must be
made according to the totality of the facts and circumstances of each individual case. As the
lower court found, the facts and circumstances of the matter at hand meet this standard and
establish that the officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI. This determination
was correct and should not be overturned, as discussed below.
In reviewing the lower court's determination that probable cause for arrest existed in the
matter at hand, the Utah Court of Appeal's application of the aforementioned standard in Lavton
City v. Noon. 736 P.2d at 1037-38, is instructive. In Noon, the Utah Court of Appeals applied
the standard in upholding a finding of probable cause to arrest for DUI where an officer
responded to a call from a convenience store clerk reporting that an intoxicated customer was
about to become an intoxicated driver. See id. at 1037. Upon arriving at the store, the officer
observed only a single automobile in the parking lot. See id. at 1038. The officer then
confirmed the identity of the individual reported with the store clerk, as well as the fact that the
individual had driven the vehicle observed in the parking lot. See id. Moreover, the officer
could smell alcohol on the defendant's breath, heard the defendant's slurred speech, and
observed the defendant's unsteady walk. The defendant also performed the field sobriety tests
poorly. See id. Given these facts, the court concluded that the officer reasonably believed "that
[the defendant] was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of
driving a vehicle, and (2) that [the defendant] had been intoxicated while driving the parked
vehicle." Id. (alteration in original).
Contrary to the assertion made by the Defendant in his appellate brief, as applied to the
matter at hand, the application of the probable cause standard articulated above yields a similar
-7-

result to that in Noon because the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the
arrest suggest that the officer reasonably believed the offense of DUI had been committed and
that the Defendant committed it. See Brief of Appellant at 12. More particularly, the facts and
circumstances known to the officer at the time he arrested the Defendant, giving rise to probable
cause, include the officer's knowingfromthe dispatch report that the driver and passenger of
the vehicle were intoxicated. (Hr'g on Mot. to Suppress Tr. at 16-17.) Once the officer
responded to the backup request from the other officer who first located the vehicle, the arresting
officer positively identified the driver of the vehicle. The officer requesting assistance told the
arresting officer that the Defendant had been the driver of the vehicle, as did the Defendant's son
and the Defendant himself. (Tr. at 13, 17.) From this information, there was no doubt that the
defendant was the driver of the vehicle.
Upon identifying the Defendant as the driver of the vehicle, the officer approached the
Defendant and detected the odor of alcohol comingfromthe Defendant's person. (Tr. at 17.)
The officer observed that the Defendant had glassy, bloodshot eyes and noticed that the
Defendant's body swayed back and forth as the Defendant spoke to the officer. (Tr. at 17.)
Additionally, as the officer began the field sobriety tests, he observed that the Defendant had a
difficult time reaching out and touching the top of the officer's pen, which the Defendant did
using the wrong finger. (Tr. at 19.) Similarly, as the officer moved the pen, the Defendant did
not follow the pen with his eyes and became upset. (Tr. at 19.) The Defendant glared at the
officer angrily as the officer moved the pen three or four times. The Defendant's demeanor
became uncooperative and belligerent. (Tr. at 19.) All of these facts and circumstances were
known to or observed by the officer prior to the time of the arrest and support a determination by
the officer that the Defendant was incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle.
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Furthermore, when the officer told the Defendant that he thought the Defendant had been
drinking, the Defendant responded, "No you don't, because I haven't had a damn thing to drink."
(Supp Hr'g Tr. at 17.) In light of the strong odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant's breath,
the Defendant's statement was a false denial and false denials are often significant in probable
cause determinations. See State v. Spureeon. 904 P.2d 220, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). It has
been stated that "'[c]ourts and commentators generally agree that a defendant's false or evasive
responses [to police questions] in conjunction with highly suspicious behavior may be used to
determine the existence of probable cause.'" Id. (quoting State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 542
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant, his physical
characteristics, his uncooperative and belligerent manner while the officer was conducting the
field sobriety tests, and his inability to adequately perform the field sobriety test(s) the officer
administered constitute "highly suspicious" behavior. This behavior suggests that the Defendant
had been drinking and was intoxicated. Thus, the Defendant's denying having had anything to
drink, coupled with this behavior and the officer's observations regarding the Defendant's
physical appearance and inability to balance, support the lower court's finding of probable cause
to arrest for DUI. Taken together, these factors support the lower court's finding that the officer
had probable cause to believe that the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol sufficient to
render him incapable of safely driving a vehicle, and that the defendant had been in control of a
vehicle while in this condition, thereby justifying the arrest.
In contrast to the Defendant's argument on appeal, the Defendant's alcohol content later
established by the intoxilyzer test was not necessary in order to establish probable cause to arrest
for DUI. In his brief, the Defendant states that "[t]he only probable cause for effecting a valid
arrest came as a result of field sobriety tests that were performed at the police station after the
-9-

original arrest had been affected." Brief for Appellant at 9. This statement is incorrect. The
remainder of the field sobriety tests were not needed to establish probable cause to arrest. The
officer had sufficient information including his own observations of the Defendant, the odor of
alcohol comingfromthe Defendant's breath, his physical appearance, and his inability to control
different parts of his body. Further tests were not needed to make the determination that the
Defendant could not safely operate a vehicle, but had done so.
Similarly, the intoxilyzer test results are not needed to find probable cause to arrest for
DUI, nor would the intoxilyzer test result be necessary to convict, according to the language of
the relevant statute. The language of the statute set forth above indicates that an individual must
be at 0.08% OR incapable of safely operating an automobile in order to be found guilty of
driving under the influence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1953 as amended) (emphasis
added). Thus, a determination of whether the individual could safely operate the vehicle would
suffice. Without the intoxilyzer test result, there is enough evidence, as discussed above, for the
officer to determine that the Defendant was incapable of safely operating an automobile, thereby
resulting in not only probable cause to arrest, but a conviction, as well. However, a conviction is
not at issue in this matter and a prima facie case of DUI need not be presented to support the
arrest. It is noted that with the intoxilyzer test results, there is also significant evidence to show
that the Defendant also violated the ordinance by operating the vehicle at a time when he was
intoxicated over the legal limit. But, again, this test is not needed to establish probable cause to
arrest.
As explained above, the Defendant's arrest was proper because the officer had probable
cause to arrest him for DUI. Since the Defendant's arrest was proper, any evidence seized
subsequently or as a result thereof is not tainted and should not be suppressed. Again, this was
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the finding of the lower court and it should be upheld.

II.

The fact that the arresting officer verbally announced that he was arresting the Defendant
for an offense different than the one for which probable cause existed does not render the
arrest invalid.
The facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest support the

determination of probable cause to arrest for DUI. In the matter at hand, the arresting officer's
report which was admitted into evidence as an exhibit states that the officer announced that he
was arresting the Defendant for obstructing justice. (Hr'g on Mot. to Suppress Tr. at 27-28.)
However, the officer testified that before he arrested the Defendant, the officer told the
Defendant that he was going to arrest the Defendant for DUI or obstructing justice. (Tr. at 19.)
The Defendant argues that the officer told the Defendant he was under arrest for obstructing
justice, there was no probable cause to do so, and, therefore, the arrest is improper. See Brief for
Appellant at 6-9. While the Defendant was uncooperative and belligerent as the officer
attempted to administer field sobriety tests to the Defendant, thereby hindering the officer's
investigation, it is questionable as to whether the officer had probable cause for arresting the
Defendant for obstructing justice. Rather, the officer had probable cause for arresting the
Defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol, as discussed above. The fact that the
officer verbally articulated the wrong offense does not invalidate the arrest and does not taint any
evidence seized as a result of the arrest.
Whether the mistaken pronouncement of the offense arrested for invalidates the arrest
where probable cause existed for another, not verbally articulated, offense, is a central issue in
the matter to be decided, as identified by the lower court at the evidentiary hearing on the
Defendant's motion to suppress. The lower court stated,
-11-

I think the issue . . . comingfromthis is going to be on whether the mistaken
pronouncement taints the whole thing or not
I'll tell you right now, if there's no case
law that says that mistaken pronouncement does not taint everything, obviously then the
Court will deny the Motion to Suppress. That's where it's at. So that's what I think it all
comes down to.
(Tr. at 46-47.) The lower court gave the Defendant fifteen daysfromthe date of the suppression
hearing to find authority that indicates that the arrest would be tainted by an incorrect
pronouncement. (Tr. at 46-47.) The Defendant produced Columbus v. Holmes, 159 N.E.2d 232
(Ohio 1959), but this case does not stand for the proposition that a mistaken pronouncement by
an officer taints the arrest. See id. In response, the lower court denied the Defendant's motion
to suppress, ruling that the intoxilyzer test results were admissible. (R. at 78.)
Until the case at bar, Utah courts have not addressed the situation where an officer
announces an arrest for a certain offense, one for which there is not probable cause, but where
there is probable cause to arrest for a different, not verbally articulated, offense. Without Utah
precedent, the Court should look to a number of other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue
and found that where the officer gives the wrong reasons for the arrest, but has probable cause to
arrest for a different offense, the arrest is not rendered invalid. In other words, the arrest is legal
and proper as supported by the probable cause, notwithstanding the fact that a different offense
is incorrectly verbally cited at the time of arrest. See People v. Corrigan, 473 N.E. 2d 140 (111.
Ct. App. 1985); Hatcher v. State. 410 N.E. 2d 1187, 1189 (Ind. 1980); State v. Luna. 606 P.2d
183, 187-88 (N.M. 1980) ("the arrest is not invalidated because the officer gave the wrong
reasons for the arrest"); State v. Weiland. 695 P.2d 85, 87 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) ("It matters not
that the officers articulated the wrong reason for the arrest; the arrest was lawful."); State v.
Huff. 826 P.2d 698, 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) ("an arrest supported by probable cause is not
made unlawful by an officer's subjective reliance on, or verbal announcement of, an offense
-12-

different from the one for which probable cause exists"); City of Seattle v. Cadigan. 776 P.2d
727, 731 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
Even the United States Supreme Court has alluded to this principle in Florida v. Rover,
460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed.2d 229 (1983). In Rover, the defendant challenged his
detention at the airport and a subsequent search. The State argued that the defendant was not
illegally detained and that the search was proper because the defendant gave his consent to the
search. The Court responded and stated,
Detective Johnson testified at the suppression hearing and the Flordia District Court
of Appeal held that there was no probable cause to arrest until Royer's bags were
opened, but the fact that the officers did not believe there was probable cause and
proceeded on a consensual or Terry-stop rationale would not foreclose the State
from justifying Royer's custody by proving probable cause and hence removing any
barrier to relying on Royer's consent to search.

Id. at 1329 (citing Peters v. New York, decided with Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40, 66-67, 88
S. Ct. 1889, 1904-5, 20 L. Ed.2d 917 (1968)). Therefore, in Rover, the State could have
attempted to justify a detention after-the-fact if probable cause to arrest actually existed,
regardless of whether the officers involved were aware that probable cause existed at that time.
This rule should apply to the matter at hand.
As applied to the case at bar, it does not matter whether the officer pronounced the
correct offense at the time of making the arrest. There simply had to be probable cause for arrest
at that time. The possibility of the officer's subjective belief that there was not probable cause to
arrest for a different offense is also irrelevant. Essentially, Rover and the other cases cited above
stand for the proposition that the justification of the arrest is properly made after-the-fact
according to legal principles applied to the facts known to the officer at the time of arrest. This
was the decision of the lower court in the matter at hand and it should be upheld.
-13-

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The facts and circumstances of the matter at hand indicate that the Defendant's arrest was
proper because the officer had probable cause to believe that the crime of DUI had been
committed and that the Defendant had committed it. Again, the officer smelled a strong odor of
alcohol comingfromthe Defendant's breath and observed the Defendant's bloodshot, glassy
eyes. The officer also observed the Defendant's body sway back and forth as he spoke with the
officer. When trying to administer the field sobriety tests to the Defendant, the Defendant
struggled with the first one and became uncooperative and belligerent during the second. The
Defendant also adamantly denied having had anything to drink. Under these circumstances, the
officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI. Any pronouncement of any other
offense at the time of the arrest is irrelevant to the propriety of the arrest itself. Therefore, the
Defendant's arrest was proper and any evidence seized as a result thereof was proper and should
not be suppressed. Such was the determination by the lower court and it should be upheld at this
time.
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